By Therang Buengu
In my life there have been a few rare occasions when I wished I were younger. Such futile sentiments are usually followed by a mixture of nostalgia and regret. Sitting now in a coffee shop, watching the Tibetan pop vocal group Yudruk perform Milam, I am struck by these feelings once again. I wish I were experiencing this as a younger man. I wish I had had the chance to be cool and be Tibetan when I was a young college student in Beijing.
In those days, I struggled to express who I wanted to be. Looking back, I can see that I was searching for a way to be “cool” and be Tibetan at the same time. Of course, back then, the term cool didn’t exist, either in Tibetan or Chinese. And whatever it was, “coolness” was the last thing associated with Tibetans in the Chinese imagination. As a young Tibetan who grew up in the Chinese education system, we didn’t yet know how to live outside Chinese imagination.
I still vividly remember my first journey into the Chinese heartland. In the barren city of Golmud in the Tsaidam desert, I had a conversation with my fellow Tibetan travelers—all freshmen headed to college— about how to be a Tibetan in this new land where we would spend the next four years. One student had already been to China as a soccer player. He told us that we needed to carry a Tibetan knife and act a little savage. For some reason, there happened to be an abundance of Tibetan knives to buy in the dusty market of Golmud. I think I was the only one who did not rush to buy a knife. I just couldn't picture myself with a big Tibetan knife dangling at my waist, swaggering around the Chinese capital.
I was dreaming of something else—of finding a way to be both Tibetan and modern.
But soon after we arrived, I found out that in China's national imagination there was no space for me to be both. Who I could be was already predetermined.
From the early days of China’s rule in Tibet, a dark and savage image of Tibetans was created and propagated: dark skinned, greasy, barbaric and in need of civilization and liberation. This image became widespread through the mute character Champa in the classic film Nongnu. As the story goes, when the People’s Liberation Army finally liberated Champa from his slave master, this man who hadn’t spoken for years cried out in gratitude, “Long live Chairman Mao!” That caricature not only became ingrained in China's national imagination, it also became an integral part of modern China's national narrative.
In fact, in the mad drama of contemporary China, there were only two sanctioned Tibetan characters scripted by the Party. We had the option of being either the pre-liberation savage or the post-liberation political sycophant, indebted to the Party for rescuing us from ourselves.
Most of us were too smart and too proud to play the post-liberation sycophant. So that left us with the role of savages. Back in Tibet, we tended to be quiet, mild-mannered, even nerdy students. But in China we became street fighters. We brawled in restaurants and beat up other students in school. Everyone pretended to be frightened of us and we pretended we were untamed wild men. We were Tibetan.
Meanwhile my dream of becoming a cool, modern Tibetan remained shrouded in the distance.
Nowadays, I understand that Tibetan college students in China have their own set of challenges in being Tibetan. But as the story of China becomes more diverse and complicated, Tibetans are also coming out from the shadow of the liberation narrative. There are now extraordinarily conflicting images of Tibetans settling into the Chinese mind. Now we are rioters, learned Buddhist scholars, corrupt party bosses, smart college kids, the best looking man in China, stubborn religious fanatics—and of course, we are also cool like the four young men of Yudruk.
The Yudruk phenomenon shows not only that Tibetans can be cool, but that it is cool to be Tibetan. This is a radical shift. But not only does it show a kind of Tibetanness that is on the cutting edge of cool. It also makes it clear that a Tibetan image can be created and exist entirely outside of the Chinese imagination. This is a kind of Tibetanness that was made by and for Tibetans.
Last night I had a beautiful dream,
I dreamed about Bod, the Land of Snow
Dream about five colors of the flowers bloomed
Dream about blue dragon land on grand
As I watch these intensely Tibetan and coolly hip young performers, I can see that they have a new audience in mind: other young Tibetans. They are no longer just trying to fit into the Chinese national story; instead they are creating their own.
It is a new cultural moment, and I am excited about what new possibilities this might offer young Tibetans. They are starting to have the chance to be many things and at same time still be Tibetan. Still at the same time, I also feel a tug of sadness for my own lost youth, wandering in the shadow of oppressive stories that I could not control and yet found hard to escape.
Watch Yudruk's Milam :
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nk365rwB3WM
Read more!
Monday, August 10, 2009
Friday, January 9, 2009
从华尔街到帕廓街
Therang Buengu（特让苯股）
(这篇文章的第一搞是用英文写成的）
一只蝴蝶在地球这边拍动双翅时产生的气流，最终能在地球那边触发暴风雨的说法也许是真的。然而在我曾经的记忆里，纽约华尔街上掀起的各种飓风，还从来没有刮到拉萨的帕廓街上。但这次看来可能会例外了，不管是好是坏。
不过，我想在这里讨论的，倒不是美国股票交易市场华尔街，对近年来蜂拥中国股市炒股的拉萨奈且巴（我们把所有拿政府工资的人泛称“奈且巴”，意思相当于干部）的钱包可能产生的影响。在这一次的华尔街经融危机之前，他们的钱就已经不翼而飞了。大概一年前，这些人在每天的麻将桌上还经常夸耀自己在股市上赚了多少钱，而如今他们在无聊地浸泡在“囊玛”（藏式歌舞厅）时连有关股价都不准讨论了，因为这类话题让他们灰心丧气。近半年多来，上证综合指数一落千丈，他们的钱可能连本代利基本上已经蒸发了。眼见让他们梦想联翩的钱就这么化为泡影不免有些同情，但我刚才说了，不打算议论他们的事，而是想说说如今绵延全球的经济危机，对藏人的经济可能产生的影响。
全球-中国-西藏
有件事现在越来越清晰，那就是华尔街的暴跌对以外销为主的中国经济正在产生巨大的影响，有人预测这将可能触动中国的政治。最近和几个朋友聊天时，其中一位中国学者说他和他的许多同事本以为这次美国为主的经济危机，也如几年前的亚洲金融危机，会对中国沿海地区的外资企业产生一些影响，中央也可能需要增加一点投资来刺激经济的持续发展，而且也像上次一样，中国又能安全躲过这次的金融风暴，但是，“现在看来，这次可能不太一样，”他说。不过这次将会有什么样的不一样，现在还很难预测。因此，在华尔街揭幕的悲剧，最终会如何在拉萨的帕廓街上演也无从知晓。可以说，如今西藏的命运比过去任何时候都更紧密地与中国联系在一起了，西藏的何去何从是要看中国的选择的。而华尔街的风暴，将会对帕廓街产生怎样的影响，也大致取决于中国将如何面对这一次的全球经济危机。
如果这一次的世界经济风暴把中国拖进严重的经济危机的话，这将对中国的政治产生什么样的冲击呢？目前，中国学者中对此有各种不同的观点：有些人认为经济萧条导致失业工人的抗议事件不断增加，不稳定因素蔓延全国；面对这些危机，中共会本能地去使用他最拿手的一招，即加强政治上的控制和武力镇压，中国将有可能开始走回头路，过去三十年的进展会一败涂地。但有些人认为，中共面对危机选择强硬路线是可想而知的，若经济危机一时不能改观的话，走回头路将不再是摆在中共领导人面前的选择，因此，一个时间较长的大的经济危机可能会最终促使中国的政治改革。也有一些学者认为，如果这次全球经济危机发生在十年、二十年之前的话，中国将会面临巨大的政治和社会挑战，但如今中国的经济已经非常庞大，有能力把这一次的风暴局限在经济领域，也即是说经济挫折不会引发政治地震；他们中的一些人甚至认为可能是中国实现百年梦想的历史机遇，在以美国为主的西方国家陷入经济危机之时，中国走上世界强国之路的机会将终于来临。
毫无疑问，如此巨大的政治变动：中国的政治变得更强硬或逐渐开明化；中国进入动乱或变成世界强国，都将对政治上极其敏感的西藏产生不成比例的巨大影响。但现在谁也无法料知这次经济危机会否导致政治变革。依我看，中国变成世界强国的梦，估计还有另一个漫漫长夜需要熬过，那么，且让我们把讨论的范围局限在我们已经知道的事情上吧。
两个不同轨道上的两个经济
据西藏自治区主席向巴平措介绍，西藏自治区GDP 增长率在2008年可能达到10.1左右，他预测新的一年里，西藏的GDP可以继续以两位数增长。当然几乎在任何问题上，我想不出与这位官员有可能认同，不过我以为，如果你平时就相信西藏的社会经济统计数据的话，他的这个估测还是比较实际的。西藏自治区的经济，一直是依赖中央的大量补贴来带动并维持的。进一步地说，北京把大笔经费拨给西藏之后，其中大部分归于西藏各级官员，或投资在为他们而设置的各项服务行业，或投资于为他们记功叫好的各种“形象工程”。这种非自然的经济已经到了令人讽刺的地步，使一位英国的经济学家发现，西藏自治区政府的行政运作本身已变成推动西藏经济发展的引擎。在这种政治化的经济中，政治气候远比经济条件更重要，而在目前西藏的政治环境下，中央当然会继续盲目增加补贴，也因此，尽管中国面临经济萧条，但西藏的GDP 还会继续增长，这是可以预见的。
总体来说，西藏的干部阶层是靠中央补贴生活的。他们在上海股市上赌博的钱，如同高原上的冰川，已经融化得没剩多少，我估计新的一年里，不太会听到他们痛斥中国股市上那些大庄家是如何操作股市的，因为他们工资照拿，不管在股市上丢了多少钱，他们仍然是西藏的贵族阶级。而其余的大多数藏人的经济生活，则一直是在另一个经济轨道上运行的，这些自给自足的藏人的经济轨道与中国的主体经济乃至世界主体经济的轨道，相互交错和相互影响的机会是微不足道的，所以除非有大的自然灾害，大多数藏人即农牧民，可能不太会感受到世界经济风暴的余威，当然，这并不意味着与藏人的经济无关。
西藏的经济vs藏人的经济
理解今日西藏境内的经济运作，首先要弄清两个概念。而这两个不同的概念往往被误认为是一回事。我们时常从中国的官方媒体听到的所谓“西藏经济”，实则与藏人的日常生活息息相关的藏人经济是两码事，而后者很少在中国的公共场合讨论。这两种经济，虽然有时相互交错，有些地方甚至相互重叠，然而，实质上非但不是一种，而且有的时候是针锋相对的。如《西藏日报》在报道西藏经济如何如何增长的时候，从它自己的角度看，倒也并非完全是虚张声势，只是它所说的经济大好形势并不意味着藏人经济利益的提高。换句话说，对西藏的经济有利，不一定对藏人的经济有益。
两种经济交叉和重叠的灰色地带
如前所说，尽管这两种经济基本上是在两个不同的轨道上运行，但它们有时相互交叉甚至重叠。依我看，这些交叉的或重叠的灰色地带，或有可能受这次全球经济风暴影响最大，而旅游业则是其中最明显的一个。近年来，西藏佛教寺院和古城，以及新鲜的空气和碧蓝的天空吸引了刚刚走上富裕之路的成千上万个汉人旅游者。2007年，到西藏自治区的旅游人数达四百多万，创下了历史纪录。随着旅游业的迅速发展，许多藏人在与旅游有关的旅店、饭馆之类的服务行业投资了不少资金，连一些农牧民也渴望通过给汉人旅游者牵马背包等杂工来赚些零钱。
但在去年藏区发生抗议事件之后，当局在当地用武力镇压藏人的同时，动用媒体把藏人的宗教文化乃至藏民族妖魔化，这就把旅游热潮一夜之间化为冰冻。连官方也承认去年到西藏自治区的旅游人数比前一年少了７０％左右。如今拉萨的所有饭店旅馆即使折价招徕游客，生意还是冷冷静静。不过若和旅游业有关的藏人议论，他们大都会告诉你这只是去年动乱造成的暂时现象，一旦西藏的形势恢复到三月抗议之前的气氛，旅游业会很快返回到2007年的水平。
可是，从目前的全球尤其是中国的经济形势来看，即便今年不发生大的政治事件，旅游业在新的一年里的前景也不可乐观。看来今年的帕廓街上，不太可能像往年一样被汉人旅游者挤得人满为患了。对于藏人来说，西藏旅游业的意外冷却意味着经济和文化利益的复杂性。靠旅游业为生的藏人会感到失望，大多数藏人则可能会松一口气，因为旅游业的清淡或许会使拉萨四川化的速度放慢一点，这也许是这次国际经济所带来的不幸中，一丝值得庆幸之处。
绝大多数西藏的农牧民仍然过着自给自足的生活。但近年来，人数不少的农牧民靠卖虫草和松茸来增加现金收入，对他们来说，这个虫草经济和松茸经济是举足轻重的。但过去一年的虫草生意很不理想。如果世界经济消退，对中国和新加坡及香港等国家和地区产生较大的冲击，那么新的一年里，虫草的价格可能会继续下跌。至于出产松茸的地区，就得看在这次全球经济危机中，日本的家庭主妇们在每日的货币市场上损失了多少钱（由于日本男人忙于公司的工作和晚上的社交活动，日本家庭的储蓄都由家庭主妇掌控，这些主妇每天在货币市场上买卖。由于她们掌控的资金庞大，所以对世界的货币市场能起重要作用），她们是否觉得自己还有足够的钱来继续享受西藏高原的野生蘑菇？而出口西藏野生蘑菇的这些中间人（大多是汉人），会不会因为中国经济萧条，更加无情地敲诈这些捡松茸的可怜的藏人农牧民？从现在的各种迹象来看的确令人担忧，但愿这些农牧民受到的影响不像我现在担心的那么严重，他们实在需要这点额外的现金收入来购买茶和衣料之类的日需品，有很多人甚至完全靠这点收入来维持生活。
另一个可能受到这次世界经济危机影响的是西藏的房地产市场，特别是拉萨的房价。在过去几年里，拉萨的房地产价格每年以两位数增加。因可能赚到大钱的诱惑，几乎所有稍有钱的和有关系拿到贷款的拉萨人，不仅给自己买了可供居住的一栋房子，还为投资赚钱买了两三栋，甚至四五栋房子。对于现代房地产生意还一无所知的拉萨人来说，他们仍然根本不相信房价有时不仅走低，甚至还会崩溃。我有点忧虑拉萨的房产主们，即将要上一堂现代经济学从NO.1开始的课了。尽管目前拉萨的房价仍然基本稳定，但如果你问正在想法卖房子的人，他们会告诉你现在很难找到买主。生活在一个成熟的房地产市场的人都知道，供过于求是房价走低的第一个信号。如果这次的国际经济大萧条加上近来西藏政治不稳定等因素，导致拉萨房地产价格大幅度跌落，这将对拉萨的干部阶层从钱包到对经济的信心都会有巨大的打击。
无论这次全球经济危机最终推动中国的政治变化与否，仅从经济的角度来看，华尔街的大地震，至少会使拉萨帕廓街上的一部分藏人也能感受到其余震了。
西藏在经济上也不再是一个与世隔绝的地方了。 Read more!
(这篇文章的第一搞是用英文写成的）
一只蝴蝶在地球这边拍动双翅时产生的气流，最终能在地球那边触发暴风雨的说法也许是真的。然而在我曾经的记忆里，纽约华尔街上掀起的各种飓风，还从来没有刮到拉萨的帕廓街上。但这次看来可能会例外了，不管是好是坏。
不过，我想在这里讨论的，倒不是美国股票交易市场华尔街，对近年来蜂拥中国股市炒股的拉萨奈且巴（我们把所有拿政府工资的人泛称“奈且巴”，意思相当于干部）的钱包可能产生的影响。在这一次的华尔街经融危机之前，他们的钱就已经不翼而飞了。大概一年前，这些人在每天的麻将桌上还经常夸耀自己在股市上赚了多少钱，而如今他们在无聊地浸泡在“囊玛”（藏式歌舞厅）时连有关股价都不准讨论了，因为这类话题让他们灰心丧气。近半年多来，上证综合指数一落千丈，他们的钱可能连本代利基本上已经蒸发了。眼见让他们梦想联翩的钱就这么化为泡影不免有些同情，但我刚才说了，不打算议论他们的事，而是想说说如今绵延全球的经济危机，对藏人的经济可能产生的影响。
全球-中国-西藏
有件事现在越来越清晰，那就是华尔街的暴跌对以外销为主的中国经济正在产生巨大的影响，有人预测这将可能触动中国的政治。最近和几个朋友聊天时，其中一位中国学者说他和他的许多同事本以为这次美国为主的经济危机，也如几年前的亚洲金融危机，会对中国沿海地区的外资企业产生一些影响，中央也可能需要增加一点投资来刺激经济的持续发展，而且也像上次一样，中国又能安全躲过这次的金融风暴，但是，“现在看来，这次可能不太一样，”他说。不过这次将会有什么样的不一样，现在还很难预测。因此，在华尔街揭幕的悲剧，最终会如何在拉萨的帕廓街上演也无从知晓。可以说，如今西藏的命运比过去任何时候都更紧密地与中国联系在一起了，西藏的何去何从是要看中国的选择的。而华尔街的风暴，将会对帕廓街产生怎样的影响，也大致取决于中国将如何面对这一次的全球经济危机。
如果这一次的世界经济风暴把中国拖进严重的经济危机的话，这将对中国的政治产生什么样的冲击呢？目前，中国学者中对此有各种不同的观点：有些人认为经济萧条导致失业工人的抗议事件不断增加，不稳定因素蔓延全国；面对这些危机，中共会本能地去使用他最拿手的一招，即加强政治上的控制和武力镇压，中国将有可能开始走回头路，过去三十年的进展会一败涂地。但有些人认为，中共面对危机选择强硬路线是可想而知的，若经济危机一时不能改观的话，走回头路将不再是摆在中共领导人面前的选择，因此，一个时间较长的大的经济危机可能会最终促使中国的政治改革。也有一些学者认为，如果这次全球经济危机发生在十年、二十年之前的话，中国将会面临巨大的政治和社会挑战，但如今中国的经济已经非常庞大，有能力把这一次的风暴局限在经济领域，也即是说经济挫折不会引发政治地震；他们中的一些人甚至认为可能是中国实现百年梦想的历史机遇，在以美国为主的西方国家陷入经济危机之时，中国走上世界强国之路的机会将终于来临。
毫无疑问，如此巨大的政治变动：中国的政治变得更强硬或逐渐开明化；中国进入动乱或变成世界强国，都将对政治上极其敏感的西藏产生不成比例的巨大影响。但现在谁也无法料知这次经济危机会否导致政治变革。依我看，中国变成世界强国的梦，估计还有另一个漫漫长夜需要熬过，那么，且让我们把讨论的范围局限在我们已经知道的事情上吧。
两个不同轨道上的两个经济
据西藏自治区主席向巴平措介绍，西藏自治区GDP 增长率在2008年可能达到10.1左右，他预测新的一年里，西藏的GDP可以继续以两位数增长。当然几乎在任何问题上，我想不出与这位官员有可能认同，不过我以为，如果你平时就相信西藏的社会经济统计数据的话，他的这个估测还是比较实际的。西藏自治区的经济，一直是依赖中央的大量补贴来带动并维持的。进一步地说，北京把大笔经费拨给西藏之后，其中大部分归于西藏各级官员，或投资在为他们而设置的各项服务行业，或投资于为他们记功叫好的各种“形象工程”。这种非自然的经济已经到了令人讽刺的地步，使一位英国的经济学家发现，西藏自治区政府的行政运作本身已变成推动西藏经济发展的引擎。在这种政治化的经济中，政治气候远比经济条件更重要，而在目前西藏的政治环境下，中央当然会继续盲目增加补贴，也因此，尽管中国面临经济萧条，但西藏的GDP 还会继续增长，这是可以预见的。
总体来说，西藏的干部阶层是靠中央补贴生活的。他们在上海股市上赌博的钱，如同高原上的冰川，已经融化得没剩多少，我估计新的一年里，不太会听到他们痛斥中国股市上那些大庄家是如何操作股市的，因为他们工资照拿，不管在股市上丢了多少钱，他们仍然是西藏的贵族阶级。而其余的大多数藏人的经济生活，则一直是在另一个经济轨道上运行的，这些自给自足的藏人的经济轨道与中国的主体经济乃至世界主体经济的轨道，相互交错和相互影响的机会是微不足道的，所以除非有大的自然灾害，大多数藏人即农牧民，可能不太会感受到世界经济风暴的余威，当然，这并不意味着与藏人的经济无关。
西藏的经济vs藏人的经济
理解今日西藏境内的经济运作，首先要弄清两个概念。而这两个不同的概念往往被误认为是一回事。我们时常从中国的官方媒体听到的所谓“西藏经济”，实则与藏人的日常生活息息相关的藏人经济是两码事，而后者很少在中国的公共场合讨论。这两种经济，虽然有时相互交错，有些地方甚至相互重叠，然而，实质上非但不是一种，而且有的时候是针锋相对的。如《西藏日报》在报道西藏经济如何如何增长的时候，从它自己的角度看，倒也并非完全是虚张声势，只是它所说的经济大好形势并不意味着藏人经济利益的提高。换句话说，对西藏的经济有利，不一定对藏人的经济有益。
两种经济交叉和重叠的灰色地带
如前所说，尽管这两种经济基本上是在两个不同的轨道上运行，但它们有时相互交叉甚至重叠。依我看，这些交叉的或重叠的灰色地带，或有可能受这次全球经济风暴影响最大，而旅游业则是其中最明显的一个。近年来，西藏佛教寺院和古城，以及新鲜的空气和碧蓝的天空吸引了刚刚走上富裕之路的成千上万个汉人旅游者。2007年，到西藏自治区的旅游人数达四百多万，创下了历史纪录。随着旅游业的迅速发展，许多藏人在与旅游有关的旅店、饭馆之类的服务行业投资了不少资金，连一些农牧民也渴望通过给汉人旅游者牵马背包等杂工来赚些零钱。
但在去年藏区发生抗议事件之后，当局在当地用武力镇压藏人的同时，动用媒体把藏人的宗教文化乃至藏民族妖魔化，这就把旅游热潮一夜之间化为冰冻。连官方也承认去年到西藏自治区的旅游人数比前一年少了７０％左右。如今拉萨的所有饭店旅馆即使折价招徕游客，生意还是冷冷静静。不过若和旅游业有关的藏人议论，他们大都会告诉你这只是去年动乱造成的暂时现象，一旦西藏的形势恢复到三月抗议之前的气氛，旅游业会很快返回到2007年的水平。
可是，从目前的全球尤其是中国的经济形势来看，即便今年不发生大的政治事件，旅游业在新的一年里的前景也不可乐观。看来今年的帕廓街上，不太可能像往年一样被汉人旅游者挤得人满为患了。对于藏人来说，西藏旅游业的意外冷却意味着经济和文化利益的复杂性。靠旅游业为生的藏人会感到失望，大多数藏人则可能会松一口气，因为旅游业的清淡或许会使拉萨四川化的速度放慢一点，这也许是这次国际经济所带来的不幸中，一丝值得庆幸之处。
绝大多数西藏的农牧民仍然过着自给自足的生活。但近年来，人数不少的农牧民靠卖虫草和松茸来增加现金收入，对他们来说，这个虫草经济和松茸经济是举足轻重的。但过去一年的虫草生意很不理想。如果世界经济消退，对中国和新加坡及香港等国家和地区产生较大的冲击，那么新的一年里，虫草的价格可能会继续下跌。至于出产松茸的地区，就得看在这次全球经济危机中，日本的家庭主妇们在每日的货币市场上损失了多少钱（由于日本男人忙于公司的工作和晚上的社交活动，日本家庭的储蓄都由家庭主妇掌控，这些主妇每天在货币市场上买卖。由于她们掌控的资金庞大，所以对世界的货币市场能起重要作用），她们是否觉得自己还有足够的钱来继续享受西藏高原的野生蘑菇？而出口西藏野生蘑菇的这些中间人（大多是汉人），会不会因为中国经济萧条，更加无情地敲诈这些捡松茸的可怜的藏人农牧民？从现在的各种迹象来看的确令人担忧，但愿这些农牧民受到的影响不像我现在担心的那么严重，他们实在需要这点额外的现金收入来购买茶和衣料之类的日需品，有很多人甚至完全靠这点收入来维持生活。
另一个可能受到这次世界经济危机影响的是西藏的房地产市场，特别是拉萨的房价。在过去几年里，拉萨的房地产价格每年以两位数增加。因可能赚到大钱的诱惑，几乎所有稍有钱的和有关系拿到贷款的拉萨人，不仅给自己买了可供居住的一栋房子，还为投资赚钱买了两三栋，甚至四五栋房子。对于现代房地产生意还一无所知的拉萨人来说，他们仍然根本不相信房价有时不仅走低，甚至还会崩溃。我有点忧虑拉萨的房产主们，即将要上一堂现代经济学从NO.1开始的课了。尽管目前拉萨的房价仍然基本稳定，但如果你问正在想法卖房子的人，他们会告诉你现在很难找到买主。生活在一个成熟的房地产市场的人都知道，供过于求是房价走低的第一个信号。如果这次的国际经济大萧条加上近来西藏政治不稳定等因素，导致拉萨房地产价格大幅度跌落，这将对拉萨的干部阶层从钱包到对经济的信心都会有巨大的打击。
无论这次全球经济危机最终推动中国的政治变化与否，仅从经济的角度来看，华尔街的大地震，至少会使拉萨帕廓街上的一部分藏人也能感受到其余震了。
西藏在经济上也不再是一个与世隔绝的地方了。 Read more!
Monday, January 5, 2009
From Wall Street to Barkhor Street
By Therang Buengu
It might be true that the beating of the wings of a butterfly can eventually cause storms on the other side of the earth. But in my memory, the storms of Wall Street have never before reached Lhasa’s Barkhor Street. But for better or worse, this time may be different.
No, I'm not talking about Wall Street's possible impact on those lachebas or "cadre class" (in Lhasa we generally call lachebas anyone who gets a salary from the state) who rushed to Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market over the past few years. Their money was long gone even before the current Wall Street crisis. Over a year ago, they may have been bragging during their daily mahjong games about how much money they had made. But these days no one is even allowed to talk about the stock prices in the nangmas (Tibetan-style nightclub) because the price of shares is so low it makes them depressed to even hear about it. All their profits and most of their original investments have evaporated. It is sad to see them these days, but that’s not what I want to talk about. What I want to talk about is the global economic downturn's possible impact on Tibet.
Global - China - Tibet
One thing is clear. The collapse on Wall Street has already had a major impact on China's export driven economy and therefore on potentially on China's political landscape. Recently at a dinner table, a prominent Chinese scholar told me that he, like many of his colleagues, thought a few months ago that this US financial crisis would be like Asia’s financial crisis. China might have to close down some factories in the south, and the central government might need to pump some more money into the market. But China would be able to weather the storm without facing serious challenges. However, "[i]t looks though this time it is going to be different," he said. How different remains unknown, therefore no one can really predict how Wall Street's drama will play out on Barkhor Street. These days, more than ever before, Tibet’s prospects seem mostly dependent on what China becomes. How China deals with this global economic crisis will determine what impact it will have on Barkhor Street.
Among the Chinese commentators, there is a wide range of views on what might take place if this global economic downturn drags China into a major economic crisis. Some think that as laid off workers stage demonstrations, unrest will spread throughout the nation. The Communist party will do what it knows best - tightening up politically and cracking down on any dissent. China might begin backtracking some of the progress it has made in the past three decades. Others believe that while the Beijing leadership will anxiously try to use its power to increase political control in a time of political and economic uncertainty, walking backward is no longer an option. If the economic crisis is prolonged, then finally it might induce the long awaited political reform in China. Still other Chinese commentators think that if this global economic crisis took place ten years ago, then China would be in serious trouble, but now that China's economy is large enough to take a blow, the effects will be painful but at least limited to the economy. In other words it won’t be painful enough to produce a political earthquake. Among them some even believe this is a historic opportunity for China to assert its economic and political power on the international stage while the West is weakened by the economic crisis. They hope the century old dream of China becoming a world power might finally be realized.
It is without question, a major political earthquake, whether China tightens up or liberalizes; whether it plunges into chaos or becomes the leading world power. All these scenarios will have a disproportionate effect on a politically hypersensitive place like Tibet. But at this moment it is hard to predict whether this economic downturn will turn into a political one or not. I think the dreams of China becoming a world power may still have to wait another long night. So let us stick to the things already taking place and see what they might mean for Tibet.
Two Economies in Two Orbits
According Champa Phuntsog, this year TAR's GDP is expected to grow 10.1. He forecasts that it will continue with double digit growth for the next year. Now I don’t particularly like to be in agreement with Champa Phuntsog on any issue, but if you go by the TAR's economic data in general, I think his assessment is about right. TAR's GDP has been mostly driven by Beijing's subsidies. The sea of money from Beijing is largely divided by the TAR officials or invested into the sector that will serve these officials or poured into some trophy project. So much so that as London-based economist Andrew Fisher put it: now the TAR's administration itself is the engine of TAR's economic growth. In this kind of politicized economy, political climate is more important than economic conditions. Given the current political environment in Tibet, Beijing will not only continue to senselessly pour money into Tibet, in fact it is most likely to increase. Therefore, TAR's GDP will continue to grow even as China faces economic hardship. Furthermore, to deal with the economic slowdown, the Chinese central government is already committed to a trillion yuan stimulation package and promises more to come. So far, the Chinese government intention is to use this money mainly on infrastructure projects, so more mega-projects along with more Chinese workers coming into Tibet is to be expected. The GDP most likely will continue to increase in the coming years.
Those lachebas, who have been gambling on the Shanghai stock market, already lost most of their money long before this economic crisis, so I don't expect to hear much of their cursing of the big Chinese investors who manipulate the market in the coming year. The rest of the Tibetan population has always been in a different economic orbit. The chance of Tibet’s subsistence economy intersecting with China's mainstream economic orbit is negligible. Therefore unless there is a natural disaster, the majority of Tibetan farmers and nomads wouldn’t notice much from this global economic downturn. But that doesn't mean that the global economic crisis wouldn't have any real impact on the Tibetan economy.
Tibet's Economy vs Tibetan Economy
To understand the current economy in Tibet, first we need to separate two concepts that people often perceive as one: the so-called “Tibet's economy” as often described in the Chinese official media; and the economic well being of the Tibetan people in Tibet which rarely people talk about in the public arena. These two things do overlap and intersect with each other, but they are not only not the same thing, but sometimes they are even diametrically opposed to each other. When you hear from Tibet Daily how quickly Tibet's economy is expanding, it might be true in one sense, but they in no way reflect the economic reality that matters most to Tibetans. What is good for Tibet's economy might not always be good for Tibetans.
Intersection of the Two Economies
As I said before, while the two economies are largely orbiting on two different paths, they do intersect and sometimes even overlap. The impact of this global economic crisis will be most visible in these gray areas. One of these overlapping areas is tourism. In the past few years, attracted by Tibet's ancient towns and cities, by the clean air and blue skies, tourism was boomed in Tibet as flocks of newly rich Chinese traveled to the region. In 2007 it reach to a new pitch with over four million visitors arrived in TAR. With the expectation of continued growth in the coming years, many Tibetans invested in new hotels and restaurants, while even poor villagers hoping to earn a fistful of cash led horses for annoying Chinese tourists. But with this year’s protests the government was the one that busted the boom by violently cracking down on the ground, while demonizing Tibetan culture and people through the airwaves. This year the number of tourist visits to the TAR was down almost 70 % from last year. These days hotels in Lhasa are putting out 70% - 80 % discount signs but few tourists seem interested in the enormous discounts. But if you talk to people who have much stake on the industry, they are still hoping this is a temporary setback. If some kind of stability returns, next year they can be back in business again.
But with the economic downturn both in China and globally, the outlook for tourism in Tibet is increasingly bleak even assuming the political atmosphere can return to the pre-March 2008 situation. These days, if the chilly scenes in China’s winter vacation meccas, Sanya and Sadam (Lijiang), are any indication of what to come, then next year the streets of Barkhor will not be jammed with Chinese tourists. The Implication for such a scenario for Tibet and Tibetans are complex. While for many Tibetans who economically depend on tourism this will be a huge disappointment, for many others who are anxious about the transformation of the holy city into an ugly Little Chengdu, this is may be a silver lining in this global economic crisis.
The majority of Tibetan farmers and nomads are still living in subsistence economies, just as they have for thousands of years. In some areas people depend on selling cordyceps and mushrooms. For those who doing credible business, it hasn’t been a good year and the coming year will most likely be evening harder. For the mushroom growing region, we have to see how badly the "Japanese housewives" are doing on their morning money exchange market - whether they still feel rich enough to indulge in exotic wild mushrooms from Tibet or not, or whether those Chinese middle men driven by the economic downturn in China will make them even more bloodthirsty to squeeze poor Tibetan farmers and nomads even harder than before. All the signs are not good but let us hope for the best.
Another direct impact of the economic crisis seems to be on the housing market in Tibet, especially in Lhasa. In the past few years booming real estate market in Lhasa has produced double digit price increases every year. Lured by the prospect of enormous profit, everyone who has a little money or the connection to get loans from the bank bought not only a home in which to live, but two, three, even four houses for investment. Being utterly new to the modern real estate business, Tibetans in Lhasa still don’t believe there is such a thing as a housing market downturn and price decline or even collapse. But I’m afraid that they are just about to learn a lesson in Economics 101. While housing prices in Lhasa remain stable, people who try to sell their extra houses will tell you they are no longer able to find buyers. In a mature market, everyone knows that supply exceeding demand is the first sign of a coming decline of housing prices. If this economic crisis, in combination with political instability, drives the housing market into a deep ditch in Lhasa, that will have a huge impact on Lhasa’s Tibetan cadre class.
Whether this Wall Street-led global economic crisis will force China to change its politics or not, the economic earthquake alone will make some Tibetans on Barkhor Street feel real tremors.
For better or worse, even economically, Tibet is no longer an isolated place.
Read more!
It might be true that the beating of the wings of a butterfly can eventually cause storms on the other side of the earth. But in my memory, the storms of Wall Street have never before reached Lhasa’s Barkhor Street. But for better or worse, this time may be different.
No, I'm not talking about Wall Street's possible impact on those lachebas or "cadre class" (in Lhasa we generally call lachebas anyone who gets a salary from the state) who rushed to Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market over the past few years. Their money was long gone even before the current Wall Street crisis. Over a year ago, they may have been bragging during their daily mahjong games about how much money they had made. But these days no one is even allowed to talk about the stock prices in the nangmas (Tibetan-style nightclub) because the price of shares is so low it makes them depressed to even hear about it. All their profits and most of their original investments have evaporated. It is sad to see them these days, but that’s not what I want to talk about. What I want to talk about is the global economic downturn's possible impact on Tibet.
Global - China - Tibet
One thing is clear. The collapse on Wall Street has already had a major impact on China's export driven economy and therefore on potentially on China's political landscape. Recently at a dinner table, a prominent Chinese scholar told me that he, like many of his colleagues, thought a few months ago that this US financial crisis would be like Asia’s financial crisis. China might have to close down some factories in the south, and the central government might need to pump some more money into the market. But China would be able to weather the storm without facing serious challenges. However, "[i]t looks though this time it is going to be different," he said. How different remains unknown, therefore no one can really predict how Wall Street's drama will play out on Barkhor Street. These days, more than ever before, Tibet’s prospects seem mostly dependent on what China becomes. How China deals with this global economic crisis will determine what impact it will have on Barkhor Street.
Among the Chinese commentators, there is a wide range of views on what might take place if this global economic downturn drags China into a major economic crisis. Some think that as laid off workers stage demonstrations, unrest will spread throughout the nation. The Communist party will do what it knows best - tightening up politically and cracking down on any dissent. China might begin backtracking some of the progress it has made in the past three decades. Others believe that while the Beijing leadership will anxiously try to use its power to increase political control in a time of political and economic uncertainty, walking backward is no longer an option. If the economic crisis is prolonged, then finally it might induce the long awaited political reform in China. Still other Chinese commentators think that if this global economic crisis took place ten years ago, then China would be in serious trouble, but now that China's economy is large enough to take a blow, the effects will be painful but at least limited to the economy. In other words it won’t be painful enough to produce a political earthquake. Among them some even believe this is a historic opportunity for China to assert its economic and political power on the international stage while the West is weakened by the economic crisis. They hope the century old dream of China becoming a world power might finally be realized.
It is without question, a major political earthquake, whether China tightens up or liberalizes; whether it plunges into chaos or becomes the leading world power. All these scenarios will have a disproportionate effect on a politically hypersensitive place like Tibet. But at this moment it is hard to predict whether this economic downturn will turn into a political one or not. I think the dreams of China becoming a world power may still have to wait another long night. So let us stick to the things already taking place and see what they might mean for Tibet.
Two Economies in Two Orbits
According Champa Phuntsog, this year TAR's GDP is expected to grow 10.1. He forecasts that it will continue with double digit growth for the next year. Now I don’t particularly like to be in agreement with Champa Phuntsog on any issue, but if you go by the TAR's economic data in general, I think his assessment is about right. TAR's GDP has been mostly driven by Beijing's subsidies. The sea of money from Beijing is largely divided by the TAR officials or invested into the sector that will serve these officials or poured into some trophy project. So much so that as London-based economist Andrew Fisher put it: now the TAR's administration itself is the engine of TAR's economic growth. In this kind of politicized economy, political climate is more important than economic conditions. Given the current political environment in Tibet, Beijing will not only continue to senselessly pour money into Tibet, in fact it is most likely to increase. Therefore, TAR's GDP will continue to grow even as China faces economic hardship. Furthermore, to deal with the economic slowdown, the Chinese central government is already committed to a trillion yuan stimulation package and promises more to come. So far, the Chinese government intention is to use this money mainly on infrastructure projects, so more mega-projects along with more Chinese workers coming into Tibet is to be expected. The GDP most likely will continue to increase in the coming years.
Those lachebas, who have been gambling on the Shanghai stock market, already lost most of their money long before this economic crisis, so I don't expect to hear much of their cursing of the big Chinese investors who manipulate the market in the coming year. The rest of the Tibetan population has always been in a different economic orbit. The chance of Tibet’s subsistence economy intersecting with China's mainstream economic orbit is negligible. Therefore unless there is a natural disaster, the majority of Tibetan farmers and nomads wouldn’t notice much from this global economic downturn. But that doesn't mean that the global economic crisis wouldn't have any real impact on the Tibetan economy.
Tibet's Economy vs Tibetan Economy
To understand the current economy in Tibet, first we need to separate two concepts that people often perceive as one: the so-called “Tibet's economy” as often described in the Chinese official media; and the economic well being of the Tibetan people in Tibet which rarely people talk about in the public arena. These two things do overlap and intersect with each other, but they are not only not the same thing, but sometimes they are even diametrically opposed to each other. When you hear from Tibet Daily how quickly Tibet's economy is expanding, it might be true in one sense, but they in no way reflect the economic reality that matters most to Tibetans. What is good for Tibet's economy might not always be good for Tibetans.
Intersection of the Two Economies
As I said before, while the two economies are largely orbiting on two different paths, they do intersect and sometimes even overlap. The impact of this global economic crisis will be most visible in these gray areas. One of these overlapping areas is tourism. In the past few years, attracted by Tibet's ancient towns and cities, by the clean air and blue skies, tourism was boomed in Tibet as flocks of newly rich Chinese traveled to the region. In 2007 it reach to a new pitch with over four million visitors arrived in TAR. With the expectation of continued growth in the coming years, many Tibetans invested in new hotels and restaurants, while even poor villagers hoping to earn a fistful of cash led horses for annoying Chinese tourists. But with this year’s protests the government was the one that busted the boom by violently cracking down on the ground, while demonizing Tibetan culture and people through the airwaves. This year the number of tourist visits to the TAR was down almost 70 % from last year. These days hotels in Lhasa are putting out 70% - 80 % discount signs but few tourists seem interested in the enormous discounts. But if you talk to people who have much stake on the industry, they are still hoping this is a temporary setback. If some kind of stability returns, next year they can be back in business again.
But with the economic downturn both in China and globally, the outlook for tourism in Tibet is increasingly bleak even assuming the political atmosphere can return to the pre-March 2008 situation. These days, if the chilly scenes in China’s winter vacation meccas, Sanya and Sadam (Lijiang), are any indication of what to come, then next year the streets of Barkhor will not be jammed with Chinese tourists. The Implication for such a scenario for Tibet and Tibetans are complex. While for many Tibetans who economically depend on tourism this will be a huge disappointment, for many others who are anxious about the transformation of the holy city into an ugly Little Chengdu, this is may be a silver lining in this global economic crisis.
The majority of Tibetan farmers and nomads are still living in subsistence economies, just as they have for thousands of years. In some areas people depend on selling cordyceps and mushrooms. For those who doing credible business, it hasn’t been a good year and the coming year will most likely be evening harder. For the mushroom growing region, we have to see how badly the "Japanese housewives" are doing on their morning money exchange market - whether they still feel rich enough to indulge in exotic wild mushrooms from Tibet or not, or whether those Chinese middle men driven by the economic downturn in China will make them even more bloodthirsty to squeeze poor Tibetan farmers and nomads even harder than before. All the signs are not good but let us hope for the best.
Another direct impact of the economic crisis seems to be on the housing market in Tibet, especially in Lhasa. In the past few years booming real estate market in Lhasa has produced double digit price increases every year. Lured by the prospect of enormous profit, everyone who has a little money or the connection to get loans from the bank bought not only a home in which to live, but two, three, even four houses for investment. Being utterly new to the modern real estate business, Tibetans in Lhasa still don’t believe there is such a thing as a housing market downturn and price decline or even collapse. But I’m afraid that they are just about to learn a lesson in Economics 101. While housing prices in Lhasa remain stable, people who try to sell their extra houses will tell you they are no longer able to find buyers. In a mature market, everyone knows that supply exceeding demand is the first sign of a coming decline of housing prices. If this economic crisis, in combination with political instability, drives the housing market into a deep ditch in Lhasa, that will have a huge impact on Lhasa’s Tibetan cadre class.
Whether this Wall Street-led global economic crisis will force China to change its politics or not, the economic earthquake alone will make some Tibetans on Barkhor Street feel real tremors.
For better or worse, even economically, Tibet is no longer an isolated place.
Read more!
Friday, January 2, 2009
谁黑了毕华的电脑？
特让苯股
译者：台湾悬钩子
我纳闷了好几天，不知道毕华为什么突然从统战部的重要西藏部门里被解职之后，近来香港媒体的报道让我感到震惊，其中谈到她的去职，是因为她的工作电脑被黑客入侵，并导致关于西藏的机密文件被盗走。
毕华本来是统战部涉藏政策的明日之星。五十三岁的毕华，天津南开大学毕业，是1990年代在保守派强人朱晓明的调教之下，走上了升官之道。她以笔名“华子”在中国官方媒体上写了几篇有关西藏的重要评论文章。但自2002年北京开始与达赖喇嘛的特使进行了最近一轮的对话后，中央就把毕与朱两人调离了统战部。毕华成为北京藏学研究中心的副总干事。最近，她又被调回统战部，还升了官，成为统战部众多部门里负责西藏事务的局长。这是她梦寐以求的工作。
根据香港报纸明报的报道，北京的消息来源声“毕华的工作电脑遭‘黑客’入侵，导致大量中央有关对藏政策的文件被盗走，令中央西藏工作内情外泄。”明报报道中说，事件“震惊中央高层”，据说连胡锦涛都下令彻查此事。
如果你希望从我这篇文章，发现入侵毕华电脑的黑客是谁的话，那你会失望了。我不但不知道入侵毕华电脑的黑客是谁，事实上也不认识任何懂得黑客技术的人，更不用提懂得入侵像毕华那样电脑被保护森严的的人了。但我确实对于负责中国涉藏政策的人之间讳莫如深的文化略知一二：这种文化充斥着对于反华势力－－中国的敌人－－的偏执妄想，即那些人无时不刻想利用西藏来对付他们。而那样的心态也许才是真正的“不速之客”（中文里，hacker被翻译为黑客，字面上的意义为“黑色的客人”。）
也许毕华被留党查看的重要教训，就是中国最大的敌人正是自己的偏执与妄想。
中国共产党从创党开始，就对于秘密非常着迷，还常常因为耽于多疑而瘫痪。别误会我的意思，我知道对于政党而言－－不管是地下的革命组织还是稳定统治国家机器的党－－一定程度的保密是很重要的。但纵贯整个中国现代史，CCP的保密与妄想偏执的强烈程度与广度，已经毁掉了许多人的生活，而且造成无数无辜百姓的死亡。当然，就在中国走上改革开放之后，党的各种机构与政府的运作也相对变得比较透明，比较没有受以前的沙坑心态所限制。然而统战部却把中国的涉藏政策领导到相反的方向。
在过去二十多年里建立起来的、名目繁多的与西藏有关的新工作单位之中，不成比例的机构从不同程度地涉及秘密工作任务。看看近日拉萨的东部地区，成立了许多高墙包围的安全相关单位。合在一起，这个地区也许就跟文化大革命时的整个拉萨一样大。在过去二十年内，每个与西藏有关的地区、省级、与国家级的单位，都建立起自己所收集的海外藏人相关信息的机构。曾有一度，我天真的希望透过这么多情资收集，他们至少会更了解达赖喇嘛，更了解国际社会是如何看待西藏与中国的政策的。说不定可以帮助他们了解自己的白痴。
相反的，这些单位变成了中国官僚用来夸大，甚至公然捏造所谓“达赖集团”与西方反华阴谋刻意制造中国动乱的证据的工具。现在此现象已经达到了登峰造极的地步并陷入恶性循环之中。这些机构现在需要夸大、捏造外在敌人的威胁，以合理化自己庞大的经费预算，以表现自己在捍卫中国社会稳定的重要角色。
大部份的西方人对于中国在西藏所做的事情、以及中国对于达赖喇嘛与西藏的说法，都感到很困惑。这是一个既简单又复杂的问题。如果你与在这些机构里的人有近距离的接触，如果你知道他们个人的仕途与豪奢的生活方式－－甚至这些机构之所以能够生存完全仰赖这种思路－－因此这种现象的存在解释起来很简单：他们是为了自己的私利而行动，而不是为了整体社会在着想。但令人难以理解的是，为什么他们能够仍然能继续这么做下去，尽管这种做法明显地造成族群关系紧张，并且伤害了中国的国际形象，而后者似乎是他们应该非常在意的事情。
只要中国的最高领导班子与统治精英没有面对现实勇气的一天，目前这些负责西藏政策的人，就会继续拥有制造包裹西藏的恐惧泡沫的强烈欲望和实际利益。我感确定，全世界就只有这群人可以面不改色地告诉你：西藏最近所发生的抗议，都是西藏青年大会的所为。而让这些虚构的故事变成听起来具有可信度的就是他们的利益所在。而为了证明他们的正确性，他们不只摧毁别人的生活，他们自己有时候也不小心掉入他们自己创造出来的这个机器的陷阱。
毕华是中国涉藏政策的意外受害者。似乎她也受到西藏四周的恐惧与妄想力量的迫害了。不论她丢失梦寐以求的工作，是否是因为黑客入侵的关系，或只是她的同事妄想出来的－－非常有可能是这两者加起来造成的－－似乎，她也是中国涉藏政策这种偏执妄想的沙坑心态的受害者了。就这样，她也成为另一个遭逢类似命运的人。
根据明报，毕华现在是“留党查看”了。意味着，她毕竟没有完全从党的工作单位解职。毕华是个聪明的女人。她也许有一天会从阴沟里爬出来，再度担任统战部里西藏事务的重要职务是有可能的。在此之前，我更希望她在认真地反省她帮忙创造出来的涉藏政策所造成的后果。
Read more!
译者：台湾悬钩子
我纳闷了好几天，不知道毕华为什么突然从统战部的重要西藏部门里被解职之后，近来香港媒体的报道让我感到震惊，其中谈到她的去职，是因为她的工作电脑被黑客入侵，并导致关于西藏的机密文件被盗走。
毕华本来是统战部涉藏政策的明日之星。五十三岁的毕华，天津南开大学毕业，是1990年代在保守派强人朱晓明的调教之下，走上了升官之道。她以笔名“华子”在中国官方媒体上写了几篇有关西藏的重要评论文章。但自2002年北京开始与达赖喇嘛的特使进行了最近一轮的对话后，中央就把毕与朱两人调离了统战部。毕华成为北京藏学研究中心的副总干事。最近，她又被调回统战部，还升了官，成为统战部众多部门里负责西藏事务的局长。这是她梦寐以求的工作。
根据香港报纸明报的报道，北京的消息来源声“毕华的工作电脑遭‘黑客’入侵，导致大量中央有关对藏政策的文件被盗走，令中央西藏工作内情外泄。”明报报道中说，事件“震惊中央高层”，据说连胡锦涛都下令彻查此事。
如果你希望从我这篇文章，发现入侵毕华电脑的黑客是谁的话，那你会失望了。我不但不知道入侵毕华电脑的黑客是谁，事实上也不认识任何懂得黑客技术的人，更不用提懂得入侵像毕华那样电脑被保护森严的的人了。但我确实对于负责中国涉藏政策的人之间讳莫如深的文化略知一二：这种文化充斥着对于反华势力－－中国的敌人－－的偏执妄想，即那些人无时不刻想利用西藏来对付他们。而那样的心态也许才是真正的“不速之客”（中文里，hacker被翻译为黑客，字面上的意义为“黑色的客人”。）
也许毕华被留党查看的重要教训，就是中国最大的敌人正是自己的偏执与妄想。
中国共产党从创党开始，就对于秘密非常着迷，还常常因为耽于多疑而瘫痪。别误会我的意思，我知道对于政党而言－－不管是地下的革命组织还是稳定统治国家机器的党－－一定程度的保密是很重要的。但纵贯整个中国现代史，CCP的保密与妄想偏执的强烈程度与广度，已经毁掉了许多人的生活，而且造成无数无辜百姓的死亡。当然，就在中国走上改革开放之后，党的各种机构与政府的运作也相对变得比较透明，比较没有受以前的沙坑心态所限制。然而统战部却把中国的涉藏政策领导到相反的方向。
在过去二十多年里建立起来的、名目繁多的与西藏有关的新工作单位之中，不成比例的机构从不同程度地涉及秘密工作任务。看看近日拉萨的东部地区，成立了许多高墙包围的安全相关单位。合在一起，这个地区也许就跟文化大革命时的整个拉萨一样大。在过去二十年内，每个与西藏有关的地区、省级、与国家级的单位，都建立起自己所收集的海外藏人相关信息的机构。曾有一度，我天真的希望透过这么多情资收集，他们至少会更了解达赖喇嘛，更了解国际社会是如何看待西藏与中国的政策的。说不定可以帮助他们了解自己的白痴。
相反的，这些单位变成了中国官僚用来夸大，甚至公然捏造所谓“达赖集团”与西方反华阴谋刻意制造中国动乱的证据的工具。现在此现象已经达到了登峰造极的地步并陷入恶性循环之中。这些机构现在需要夸大、捏造外在敌人的威胁，以合理化自己庞大的经费预算，以表现自己在捍卫中国社会稳定的重要角色。
大部份的西方人对于中国在西藏所做的事情、以及中国对于达赖喇嘛与西藏的说法，都感到很困惑。这是一个既简单又复杂的问题。如果你与在这些机构里的人有近距离的接触，如果你知道他们个人的仕途与豪奢的生活方式－－甚至这些机构之所以能够生存完全仰赖这种思路－－因此这种现象的存在解释起来很简单：他们是为了自己的私利而行动，而不是为了整体社会在着想。但令人难以理解的是，为什么他们能够仍然能继续这么做下去，尽管这种做法明显地造成族群关系紧张，并且伤害了中国的国际形象，而后者似乎是他们应该非常在意的事情。
只要中国的最高领导班子与统治精英没有面对现实勇气的一天，目前这些负责西藏政策的人，就会继续拥有制造包裹西藏的恐惧泡沫的强烈欲望和实际利益。我感确定，全世界就只有这群人可以面不改色地告诉你：西藏最近所发生的抗议，都是西藏青年大会的所为。而让这些虚构的故事变成听起来具有可信度的就是他们的利益所在。而为了证明他们的正确性，他们不只摧毁别人的生活，他们自己有时候也不小心掉入他们自己创造出来的这个机器的陷阱。
毕华是中国涉藏政策的意外受害者。似乎她也受到西藏四周的恐惧与妄想力量的迫害了。不论她丢失梦寐以求的工作，是否是因为黑客入侵的关系，或只是她的同事妄想出来的－－非常有可能是这两者加起来造成的－－似乎，她也是中国涉藏政策这种偏执妄想的沙坑心态的受害者了。就这样，她也成为另一个遭逢类似命运的人。
根据明报，毕华现在是“留党查看”了。意味着，她毕竟没有完全从党的工作单位解职。毕华是个聪明的女人。她也许有一天会从阴沟里爬出来，再度担任统战部里西藏事务的重要职务是有可能的。在此之前，我更希望她在认真地反省她帮忙创造出来的涉藏政策所造成的后果。
Read more!
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Who Hacked Bi Hua’s Computer?
By Therang Buengu
After days of wondering why Bi Hua was abruptly removed from a key Tibet post in the United Front, I was struck by Hong Kong media reports attributing the unceremonious dismissal to the hacking of Bi Hua’s office computer and the subsequent loss of highly confidential documents concerning Tibet.
Bi Hua was formerly a rising star for Tibet policy in the United Front. A Tianjin Nankai University graduate, Bi Hua, 53, rose in the ranks under the tutelage of conservative strongman, Zhu Xiaoming, during the 1990s. She published a number of important commentary on Tibet under the pen name “Hua Zi” in the Chinese official press. But as the latest round of dialogue with the Dalai Lama's envoys began in 2002, the Central Government removed both Zhu and Bi from the agency. Bi Hua was appointed as one of the deputy heads of Beijing's Tibetology Center. More recently, she was transferred back to the United Front and promoted to the directorship of one of the bureaus in charge of Tibetan affairs. It was her long time dream post.
According to the Hong Kong publication Ming Bao, sources in Beijing claim that “Bi Hua's work computer has been intruded by ‘hackers’ and a large number of confidential document on Tibet policy has been stolen, leading to the major leakage of internal information on the central government's work in Tibet.” Ming Bao reports that the incident has “shocked the top leadership of the central government,” and even Hu Jintao has supposedly ordered an investigation.
If you are hoping to find out who hacked Bi Hua’s computer through this blogpost, then I must disappoint you. I not only do I not know who hacked Bi Hua’s computer, in fact I don’t know anyone who knows anything about hacking computers as such, let alone hacking a highly secured computer like Bi Hua’s. But I do know a thing or two about the culture of secrecy of those who handle China’s Tibet policy: it is a culture pervaded by an intense paranoia about forces—China's enemies—who are out there using Tibet to get them at any moment. That mentality may be the real “uninvited guest” (in Chinese hacker translates as heike, which literally means ‘black guest’).
Perhaps one important lesson from Bi Hua’s removal is that China’s greatest enemy is its very own paranoia.
The Chinese Communist Party from its infancy has been obsessed with secrecy and often paralyzed by its own paranoia. Don’t get me wrong. I do know that for political parties—whether underground revolutionary organizations or stable ruling parties of the state apparatus—a certain degree of confidentiality is vital. But throughout contemporary Chinese history, the intensity and extent of the CCP’s secrecy and paranoia have ruined many people’s lives and indeed led to the murder of countless innocent people. Of course, as China has embarked on a path of reform, the party organs and government operations have become relatively more transparent and less burdened by a bunker mentality. Yet the United Front has led the management of China’s Tibet policy in the opposite direction.
Among the many new Tibet related work units (danwei) that have been created over the past two decades, a disproportionate number of them are in one way or other engaged in secret operations. Look at Lhasa’s eastern area these days, where there is a range of high walled security related work units. Taken together, this area might be as big as the entire city of Lhasa during the Cultural Revolution. During the past twenty years, every Tibet related regional, provincial and national level agency built their own institutions to collect so-called overseas’ Tibet related information. At a one point I was naively hoping that through this massive information gathering, they might learn more about the Dalai Lama and better understand how the world community sees Tibet and China's policy. That might have helped them recognize their own idiocy.
Instead these institutions have become the key instruments through which to exaggerate and even outright fabricate evidence of the so-called “Dalai clique” and the western anti-China plot to create disturbances in China. It has now reached the point of a vicious cycle. These institutions now need to exaggerate and fabricate the threat of outside enemies in order to justify their enormous expenditure and promote their own important role in safeguarding China's social stability.
Most westerners are bewildered by what China has been doing in Tibet and by what China has been saying about Tibet and the Dalai Lama. It is a simple yet complex issue. If you have an intimate relationship with people working in these institutions, if you know something about their individual careers and lavish lifestyles—and in many cases their institution's very existence are integrally dependent on these perceptions—then these dynamics are simple to explain: they are acting in their own self interest, not what is in the interest of the society at large. But it is much harder to understand why they are able to continue to do this at the expense of ethnic tensions and the tarnishing of China's international image, which it seems they care so much about.
As long as China's top leadership and ruling elite don't have the courage to confront reality, those currently in charge of Tibet policy will have a powerful interest to continue their agenda of creating a bubble of fear around Tibet. I'm sure in the whole world only these people can tell you with a straight face that the recent unrest in Tibet was a creation of the Tibetan Youth Congress. It is in their vital interest to make these stories believable. And to prove their correctness, they not only destroy other lives, they themselves also, on occasion, inadvertently fall victims to this machine--one that was their own creation.
Bi Hua is an unlikely victim of China's Tibet policy. She too, it seems, has fallen prey to the forces of fear and paranoia around Tibet. Whether the sudden loss of her dream post was due to a hacker’s intrusion or simply her colleagues’ paranoia—most likely a combination of the two—it seems that she too has become a victim of the paranoid bunker mentality of China’s Tibet policy. As such, she is yet another one who has met a similar fate.
According to Ming Bao, Bi Hua has currently been "placed on probation within the party". That is, she has not been entirely removed from the party work unit. Bi Hua is a smart woman. She might one day crawl out of this ditch and return once more to a key position on Tibetan affairs within the United Front. In the meantime, I hope she is reflecting seriously on the consequences of the Tibet policy she helped build. Read more!
After days of wondering why Bi Hua was abruptly removed from a key Tibet post in the United Front, I was struck by Hong Kong media reports attributing the unceremonious dismissal to the hacking of Bi Hua’s office computer and the subsequent loss of highly confidential documents concerning Tibet.
Bi Hua was formerly a rising star for Tibet policy in the United Front. A Tianjin Nankai University graduate, Bi Hua, 53, rose in the ranks under the tutelage of conservative strongman, Zhu Xiaoming, during the 1990s. She published a number of important commentary on Tibet under the pen name “Hua Zi” in the Chinese official press. But as the latest round of dialogue with the Dalai Lama's envoys began in 2002, the Central Government removed both Zhu and Bi from the agency. Bi Hua was appointed as one of the deputy heads of Beijing's Tibetology Center. More recently, she was transferred back to the United Front and promoted to the directorship of one of the bureaus in charge of Tibetan affairs. It was her long time dream post.
According to the Hong Kong publication Ming Bao, sources in Beijing claim that “Bi Hua's work computer has been intruded by ‘hackers’ and a large number of confidential document on Tibet policy has been stolen, leading to the major leakage of internal information on the central government's work in Tibet.” Ming Bao reports that the incident has “shocked the top leadership of the central government,” and even Hu Jintao has supposedly ordered an investigation.
If you are hoping to find out who hacked Bi Hua’s computer through this blogpost, then I must disappoint you. I not only do I not know who hacked Bi Hua’s computer, in fact I don’t know anyone who knows anything about hacking computers as such, let alone hacking a highly secured computer like Bi Hua’s. But I do know a thing or two about the culture of secrecy of those who handle China’s Tibet policy: it is a culture pervaded by an intense paranoia about forces—China's enemies—who are out there using Tibet to get them at any moment. That mentality may be the real “uninvited guest” (in Chinese hacker translates as heike, which literally means ‘black guest’).
Perhaps one important lesson from Bi Hua’s removal is that China’s greatest enemy is its very own paranoia.
The Chinese Communist Party from its infancy has been obsessed with secrecy and often paralyzed by its own paranoia. Don’t get me wrong. I do know that for political parties—whether underground revolutionary organizations or stable ruling parties of the state apparatus—a certain degree of confidentiality is vital. But throughout contemporary Chinese history, the intensity and extent of the CCP’s secrecy and paranoia have ruined many people’s lives and indeed led to the murder of countless innocent people. Of course, as China has embarked on a path of reform, the party organs and government operations have become relatively more transparent and less burdened by a bunker mentality. Yet the United Front has led the management of China’s Tibet policy in the opposite direction.
Among the many new Tibet related work units (danwei) that have been created over the past two decades, a disproportionate number of them are in one way or other engaged in secret operations. Look at Lhasa’s eastern area these days, where there is a range of high walled security related work units. Taken together, this area might be as big as the entire city of Lhasa during the Cultural Revolution. During the past twenty years, every Tibet related regional, provincial and national level agency built their own institutions to collect so-called overseas’ Tibet related information. At a one point I was naively hoping that through this massive information gathering, they might learn more about the Dalai Lama and better understand how the world community sees Tibet and China's policy. That might have helped them recognize their own idiocy.
Instead these institutions have become the key instruments through which to exaggerate and even outright fabricate evidence of the so-called “Dalai clique” and the western anti-China plot to create disturbances in China. It has now reached the point of a vicious cycle. These institutions now need to exaggerate and fabricate the threat of outside enemies in order to justify their enormous expenditure and promote their own important role in safeguarding China's social stability.
Most westerners are bewildered by what China has been doing in Tibet and by what China has been saying about Tibet and the Dalai Lama. It is a simple yet complex issue. If you have an intimate relationship with people working in these institutions, if you know something about their individual careers and lavish lifestyles—and in many cases their institution's very existence are integrally dependent on these perceptions—then these dynamics are simple to explain: they are acting in their own self interest, not what is in the interest of the society at large. But it is much harder to understand why they are able to continue to do this at the expense of ethnic tensions and the tarnishing of China's international image, which it seems they care so much about.
As long as China's top leadership and ruling elite don't have the courage to confront reality, those currently in charge of Tibet policy will have a powerful interest to continue their agenda of creating a bubble of fear around Tibet. I'm sure in the whole world only these people can tell you with a straight face that the recent unrest in Tibet was a creation of the Tibetan Youth Congress. It is in their vital interest to make these stories believable. And to prove their correctness, they not only destroy other lives, they themselves also, on occasion, inadvertently fall victims to this machine--one that was their own creation.
Bi Hua is an unlikely victim of China's Tibet policy. She too, it seems, has fallen prey to the forces of fear and paranoia around Tibet. Whether the sudden loss of her dream post was due to a hacker’s intrusion or simply her colleagues’ paranoia—most likely a combination of the two—it seems that she too has become a victim of the paranoid bunker mentality of China’s Tibet policy. As such, she is yet another one who has met a similar fate.
According to Ming Bao, Bi Hua has currently been "placed on probation within the party". That is, she has not been entirely removed from the party work unit. Bi Hua is a smart woman. She might one day crawl out of this ditch and return once more to a key position on Tibetan affairs within the United Front. In the meantime, I hope she is reflecting seriously on the consequences of the Tibet policy she helped build. Read more!
Saturday, December 27, 2008
Mystery Man from Beijing
By Therang Buengu
As the upheavals of March settle into a new layer of memory, there are still a few things that linger in my mind. Among them, one still evokes in me a strange excitement every time I think about it. The mystery man from Beijing: who really is he?
In the first few days of the uprising, a person using the name of Jigme Namgyal started writing scathing articles in the Chinese language, critical of Beijing's Tibet policy. Within a few weeks, Jigme Namgyal published seven lengthy articles--a total of 30,000 or so characters. What profoundly impressed me was not the length and prolificness of his writings, but rather his intimate knowledge of Beijing's Tibet policy making circle , his intense frustration with the Beijing leadership's short sightedness on Tibet policy and his ability to express his thoughts and feelings--yes, feelings: this guy is not pretending he is a detached analyst--his articles are filled with anger, frustration and often bitter pessimism. Then at the end of May, just as he appeared suddenly out of the stormy sky, the mystery man from Beijing disappeared into the darkness of Beijing's insistence on a hardline policy on Tibet. We haven't seen his writing again. Still don't know who he or she is.
In the article entitled, "Let Our Dalai Lama Return Home", the author points out five reasons why China rejects the Dalai Lama's possible return. He then observes that "as long as CCP relies on this same irrational, inhuman, irresponsible and ineffective bunch of bureaucrats to continue managing Tibetan affairs, then the Dalai Lama will not be able to return home." In his eyes "time and time again [in not dealing with the Dalai Lama directly] China erroneously sows the seeds of ethnic and political crisis." He predicts that one day they will come back to hound the nation. In almost every line and sentence of his writing, we can feel his bitter frustration against the Chinese leadership's inability to see an alternative way to manage the Tibet issue and his outright anger against those bureaucrats whose selfishness and low IQ (di zhineng) who have been charged with this responsibility. Yet this mystery man from Beijing still holds out hope. He doesn't believe that the opportunity to resolve the Tibet issue has already "entered a an irreversible path of dead end" (西藏问题的解决已经进入了一个无可变更的死路也不竟然)". This, he believes, because it is China's interest to engage with Tibetans to resolve the issue.
In many of his articles, the mysterious man revisits the critical juncture in China's Tibet policy in the past, pointing out their political consequences in the present. To me, the most intriguing part is that when he is talking about those historical events, you can almost sense that this is not learned knowledge from books, but rather that he witnessed or even experienced them as a participant. He has in-depth understanding of Tibet under Mao's China, yet his language transcends the party phraseology to describe and analyze that tumultuous era (which is sadly not always the case--most people from that generation can't get away from using the Party language, even when criticizing the Party). Reading Jigme Namgyal's article is a rare treat. I can see the vast knowledge and experience of the older Tibetan generation, combined with the younger generation's contemporary worldview, new language and most importantly, newfound boldness and courage in his writing. This combination is a scarce commodity in contemporary writing on Tibet in the Chinese language, particularly from Tibetan authors.
We haven't seen this mysterious man's new writing for more than a half year. Yet my curiosity and desire to know this mysterious man is not only alive but grows ever more intense . Among friends, the question of the identity of the mysterious man continues to animate our conversations. Yet among all the many Tibetans we know in Beijing, those who fit in profile of this man's vast personal knowledge and have the ability to write them in the Chinese language doesn't fit the courage and passion of the author. That is precisely the most intriguing part of the story. In today's Tibetan elite, you never know what is alive deep in their hearts--who really possesses the passion and sometimes even have the courage to take enormous risks to express their sense of injustice and moral outrage against the current Tibetan predicament.
Whether this mysterious man is really living in Beijing--as he claims--or whether he is a Tibetan researcher who has been working on ethnic minority policy for many years--as he describes himself--we may never know. But I'd like to imagine that such a person exists: a Tibetan intellectual who is working on the inside the Party system, in public acting just like any other Tibetan cadre--overly cautious, obedient, most of the time blind to the suffering and humiliation that the majority of Tibetans endure--yet deep down in his heart carrying a fire of passion for Tibet that bursts forth in a time of crisis and tragedy.
Every time I think about this, I am moved.
15th December 2008, from home Read more!
As the upheavals of March settle into a new layer of memory, there are still a few things that linger in my mind. Among them, one still evokes in me a strange excitement every time I think about it. The mystery man from Beijing: who really is he?
In the first few days of the uprising, a person using the name of Jigme Namgyal started writing scathing articles in the Chinese language, critical of Beijing's Tibet policy. Within a few weeks, Jigme Namgyal published seven lengthy articles--a total of 30,000 or so characters. What profoundly impressed me was not the length and prolificness of his writings, but rather his intimate knowledge of Beijing's Tibet policy making circle , his intense frustration with the Beijing leadership's short sightedness on Tibet policy and his ability to express his thoughts and feelings--yes, feelings: this guy is not pretending he is a detached analyst--his articles are filled with anger, frustration and often bitter pessimism. Then at the end of May, just as he appeared suddenly out of the stormy sky, the mystery man from Beijing disappeared into the darkness of Beijing's insistence on a hardline policy on Tibet. We haven't seen his writing again. Still don't know who he or she is.
In the article entitled, "Let Our Dalai Lama Return Home", the author points out five reasons why China rejects the Dalai Lama's possible return. He then observes that "as long as CCP relies on this same irrational, inhuman, irresponsible and ineffective bunch of bureaucrats to continue managing Tibetan affairs, then the Dalai Lama will not be able to return home." In his eyes "time and time again [in not dealing with the Dalai Lama directly] China erroneously sows the seeds of ethnic and political crisis." He predicts that one day they will come back to hound the nation. In almost every line and sentence of his writing, we can feel his bitter frustration against the Chinese leadership's inability to see an alternative way to manage the Tibet issue and his outright anger against those bureaucrats whose selfishness and low IQ (di zhineng) who have been charged with this responsibility. Yet this mystery man from Beijing still holds out hope. He doesn't believe that the opportunity to resolve the Tibet issue has already "entered a an irreversible path of dead end" (西藏问题的解决已经进入了一个无可变更的死路也不竟然)". This, he believes, because it is China's interest to engage with Tibetans to resolve the issue.
In many of his articles, the mysterious man revisits the critical juncture in China's Tibet policy in the past, pointing out their political consequences in the present. To me, the most intriguing part is that when he is talking about those historical events, you can almost sense that this is not learned knowledge from books, but rather that he witnessed or even experienced them as a participant. He has in-depth understanding of Tibet under Mao's China, yet his language transcends the party phraseology to describe and analyze that tumultuous era (which is sadly not always the case--most people from that generation can't get away from using the Party language, even when criticizing the Party). Reading Jigme Namgyal's article is a rare treat. I can see the vast knowledge and experience of the older Tibetan generation, combined with the younger generation's contemporary worldview, new language and most importantly, newfound boldness and courage in his writing. This combination is a scarce commodity in contemporary writing on Tibet in the Chinese language, particularly from Tibetan authors.
We haven't seen this mysterious man's new writing for more than a half year. Yet my curiosity and desire to know this mysterious man is not only alive but grows ever more intense . Among friends, the question of the identity of the mysterious man continues to animate our conversations. Yet among all the many Tibetans we know in Beijing, those who fit in profile of this man's vast personal knowledge and have the ability to write them in the Chinese language doesn't fit the courage and passion of the author. That is precisely the most intriguing part of the story. In today's Tibetan elite, you never know what is alive deep in their hearts--who really possesses the passion and sometimes even have the courage to take enormous risks to express their sense of injustice and moral outrage against the current Tibetan predicament.
Whether this mysterious man is really living in Beijing--as he claims--or whether he is a Tibetan researcher who has been working on ethnic minority policy for many years--as he describes himself--we may never know. But I'd like to imagine that such a person exists: a Tibetan intellectual who is working on the inside the Party system, in public acting just like any other Tibetan cadre--overly cautious, obedient, most of the time blind to the suffering and humiliation that the majority of Tibetans endure--yet deep down in his heart carrying a fire of passion for Tibet that bursts forth in a time of crisis and tragedy.
Every time I think about this, I am moved.
15th December 2008, from home Read more!
来自北京的神秘人物
感谢台湾悬钩子的翻译，我自己在其中做了个别的改动。
就在三月的动荡转换为一层新的记忆之后，还是有一些事情伫留在我心里。这些事件之中，其中一件，每让我想起，都有特别兴奋的感觉。那位来自北京的神秘人物：他到底是谁？
在抗议开始不久，一个以晋美朗嘉为笔名的人，开始用中文写出对北京的涉藏政策相当犀利的批评文章。在几周之内，晋美朗嘉发了七篇长文－－总共三万字左右。让我印象最深刻的，不是文章的长度或他的多产，而是他对于北京涉藏决策圈的熟悉,以及他对于北京领导班子在涉藏政策上的短视之极度挫折感，还有他有能力表达自己的想法与感觉－－是的，感觉：这位作者并不假装自己是中立的分析家－－他的文章充满愤怒、挫折与苦涩的悲观。然后在五月末，就跟一两个月前他从暴风雨中横空出世一样，他又突然地消失在北京坚持对西藏采取强硬路线的黑暗里。我们至今没有再看到他的作品，也不知道他或她到底是谁。
在题为《请让我们的达赖喇嘛归来》一文中，作者指出了五个中国拒绝达赖喇嘛返乡的原因。然后他观察道，只要由“没有理性、没有勇气、没有责任感和没有未来的无素质的党棍团体”来继续经营涉藏事务，达赖喇嘛永远没有归来的一天。在他的眼中，“一次又一次〔不与达赖喇嘛直接交涉〕的错误也为自己埋下了可怕的包括民族危机在内的诸多政治危机的种子。”他预言有一天，它们会回来纠缠这个国家。在他写作的几乎每一行、每一句里，我们可以感觉到他对于中国领导班子无能找出处理西藏议题的另条道路的挫折，而他对于那些自私、低智商的官僚，居然就是被赋予这些任务的人感到极度愤怒。然而这个来自北京的神秘人物，仍然还抱持着希望。他认为“目前西藏问题的解决已是进入了一条无可变更的死路也不尽然”。这，他相信，是因为中国的利益，就在与藏人交涉，才能解决这个问题。
在他的许多文章之中，这位神秘的人物重新回顾了过往中国涉藏政策的许多重要关键，指出它们对目前所造成的政治后果。对我来说，最令人感到兴味的部分是，他谈起那些历史事件时，你几乎可以感觉到，这些知识不是他从书上学来的，而是他亲眼目睹或以参与者的身份经历过了。他对于毛泽东时代的西藏有非常深的了解，然而他的语言却超脱了党八股。阅读晋美朗嘉的文章是一种享受。我可以感到如同老一辈藏人的见多识广与丰富阅历，再加上年轻一代更加现代化的世界观，还有新的语言，更重要的是，他文章里所呈现的新生的勇气与大胆。这样的结合，在中文的西藏书写之中，几乎是非常罕见的奇葩，特别是来自一位藏人的作者。
超过半年了，我们没有见到这位神秘人物发表新的文章。然而我的好奇感，与渴望认识这神秘人物的心情，不但未消失，反而更增加、更强烈。在朋友之间，有关这位神秘人物到底是谁的问题，还可以继续让我们的对话生动起来。然而在我知道的、在北京的藏人之中，符合像这位人物一样具有广博的知识、又有能力以中文写出来的人，在勇气与热情上却对不上这位作者。事实上这恰恰就是这个故事里的最令人深思的 - 在今日的藏人精英之中，你从来不知道他们内心深处还活着的是什么－－谁真的拥有这样的热情，甚至是勇气，能够冒着危险，表达出他们对今日西藏困境的内心不平、与道德愤懑。
而不论这位神秘人物是否真的住在北京－－就像他所说的－－或者他只是一位多年来从事少数民族政策研究的藏人学者－－如同他这样描写自己－－我们也许永远都不会知道。然而我喜欢想象，有这样一位人物存在着：一个藏人知识分子，他在党的体制内工作着，表面上看起来只像是任何其他的藏人干部一样－－过度谨慎小心，唯命是从，大部份的时间对于绝大部数藏人所忍受的痛苦与屈辱都视而不见－－然而在内心深处，却满怀对于西藏的热情，而这股热情会在危机与悲剧之中突然爆发。
每次想到这一点，我就非常感动。 Read more!
就在三月的动荡转换为一层新的记忆之后，还是有一些事情伫留在我心里。这些事件之中，其中一件，每让我想起，都有特别兴奋的感觉。那位来自北京的神秘人物：他到底是谁？
在抗议开始不久，一个以晋美朗嘉为笔名的人，开始用中文写出对北京的涉藏政策相当犀利的批评文章。在几周之内，晋美朗嘉发了七篇长文－－总共三万字左右。让我印象最深刻的，不是文章的长度或他的多产，而是他对于北京涉藏决策圈的熟悉,以及他对于北京领导班子在涉藏政策上的短视之极度挫折感，还有他有能力表达自己的想法与感觉－－是的，感觉：这位作者并不假装自己是中立的分析家－－他的文章充满愤怒、挫折与苦涩的悲观。然后在五月末，就跟一两个月前他从暴风雨中横空出世一样，他又突然地消失在北京坚持对西藏采取强硬路线的黑暗里。我们至今没有再看到他的作品，也不知道他或她到底是谁。
在题为《请让我们的达赖喇嘛归来》一文中，作者指出了五个中国拒绝达赖喇嘛返乡的原因。然后他观察道，只要由“没有理性、没有勇气、没有责任感和没有未来的无素质的党棍团体”来继续经营涉藏事务，达赖喇嘛永远没有归来的一天。在他的眼中，“一次又一次〔不与达赖喇嘛直接交涉〕的错误也为自己埋下了可怕的包括民族危机在内的诸多政治危机的种子。”他预言有一天，它们会回来纠缠这个国家。在他写作的几乎每一行、每一句里，我们可以感觉到他对于中国领导班子无能找出处理西藏议题的另条道路的挫折，而他对于那些自私、低智商的官僚，居然就是被赋予这些任务的人感到极度愤怒。然而这个来自北京的神秘人物，仍然还抱持着希望。他认为“目前西藏问题的解决已是进入了一条无可变更的死路也不尽然”。这，他相信，是因为中国的利益，就在与藏人交涉，才能解决这个问题。
在他的许多文章之中，这位神秘的人物重新回顾了过往中国涉藏政策的许多重要关键，指出它们对目前所造成的政治后果。对我来说，最令人感到兴味的部分是，他谈起那些历史事件时，你几乎可以感觉到，这些知识不是他从书上学来的，而是他亲眼目睹或以参与者的身份经历过了。他对于毛泽东时代的西藏有非常深的了解，然而他的语言却超脱了党八股。阅读晋美朗嘉的文章是一种享受。我可以感到如同老一辈藏人的见多识广与丰富阅历，再加上年轻一代更加现代化的世界观，还有新的语言，更重要的是，他文章里所呈现的新生的勇气与大胆。这样的结合，在中文的西藏书写之中，几乎是非常罕见的奇葩，特别是来自一位藏人的作者。
超过半年了，我们没有见到这位神秘人物发表新的文章。然而我的好奇感，与渴望认识这神秘人物的心情，不但未消失，反而更增加、更强烈。在朋友之间，有关这位神秘人物到底是谁的问题，还可以继续让我们的对话生动起来。然而在我知道的、在北京的藏人之中，符合像这位人物一样具有广博的知识、又有能力以中文写出来的人，在勇气与热情上却对不上这位作者。事实上这恰恰就是这个故事里的最令人深思的 - 在今日的藏人精英之中，你从来不知道他们内心深处还活着的是什么－－谁真的拥有这样的热情，甚至是勇气，能够冒着危险，表达出他们对今日西藏困境的内心不平、与道德愤懑。
而不论这位神秘人物是否真的住在北京－－就像他所说的－－或者他只是一位多年来从事少数民族政策研究的藏人学者－－如同他这样描写自己－－我们也许永远都不会知道。然而我喜欢想象，有这样一位人物存在着：一个藏人知识分子，他在党的体制内工作着，表面上看起来只像是任何其他的藏人干部一样－－过度谨慎小心，唯命是从，大部份的时间对于绝大部数藏人所忍受的痛苦与屈辱都视而不见－－然而在内心深处，却满怀对于西藏的热情，而这股热情会在危机与悲剧之中突然爆发。
每次想到这一点，我就非常感动。 Read more!
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